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年中無休の家庭教師 毎日学習会

慶應義塾大学SFC 総合政策学部 英語 1996年 大問二 本文対訳

1:1 Hermeneutics began as the theory of the interpretation of texts, particularly mythical and sacred texts.
1:2 Its practitioners struggled with the problem of characterizing how people find meaning in a text that exists over many centuries and is understood differently in different epochs.
1:3 A mythical or religious text continues to be spoken or read and to serve as a source of deep meaning, in spite of (1)(1. changes 2. consistency 3. disappearance) in the underlying culture and even in the language.
1:4 There are obvious questions to be raised.
1:5 Is the meaning definable in some absolute sense, independent of the context in which the text was written?
1:5 その意味は、原典が書かれた背景から独立して、絶対的な意味において定義されうるのだろうか。
1:6 Is it definable only in terms of that original context?
1:6 それとも、原初の文脈との関係においてのみ定義されうるのだろうか。
1:7 If so, is it possible or desirable for a reader to transcend his or her own culture and the intervening history in order to (2)(1. repeat 2. reinforce 3. recover) the correct interpretation?
1:7 もしそうであるならば、読者がその正確な解釈を取り戻すために自分自身の文化と介在する歴史を超越することは、可能または望ましいことなのだろうか。
2:1 If we reject the notion that the meaning is in the text, are we (3) (1. opposed 2. reduced 3. prohibited) to saying only that a particular person at a particular moment had a particular interpretation?
2:1 もし我々が、意味は原典の中にあるという考えを拒絶するならば、それはただある特定の瞬間のある特定の人がある特定の解釈を行ったとだけ言うことに帰着させられるのであろうか。
2:2 If so, have we given up a naive but solid-seeming view of the reality of the meaning of the text in (4)(1. favor 2. spite 3. terms) of a relativistic appeal to individual subjective reaction?
2:2 もしそうであるならば我々は個人の主観的な反応に対する相対論的な訴えの方を選んで原典の意味の現実性を素朴にしかし手堅く見るのをあきらめたのだろうか。
3:1 Within hermeneutics there has been an ongoing debate between those who place the meaning (5)(1. within 2. outside 3. of) the text and those who see meaning as grounded in a process of understanding in which the text, its production, and its interpretation all play a vital part.
4:1 For the objectivist school of hermeneutics, the text must have a meaning that exists independently of the act of interpretation.
4:2 Their goal of a hermeneutic theory is to develop methods by which we rid ourselves of all prejudices and produce an objective analysis of what is really there.
4:3 The ideal is to completely (6)(1. contextualize 2. decorate 3. decontextualize) the text.
5:1 The opposing approach, most clearly formulated by Gadamer, takes the act of interpretation as primary, understanding it as an interaction between the ‘horizon’ provided by the text and the horizon that the interpreter brings to it.
5:1 これとは逆のアプローチは、ガダマーによって最も明確に作り上げられたものであるが、解釈行為を最も重要なものと考え、原典によって与えられる「視野」と解釈者が原典にもたらす「視野」の間の相互作用として理解する。
5:2 Gadamer (7)(1. denies 2. questions 3. insists) that every reading or hearing of a text constitutes an act of giving meaning to it through interpretation.
5:2 ガダマーは、原典を読んだり聞いたりするすべての行為が解釈を通して原典に意味を与える行為を構成すると主張する。
6:1 Gadamer devotes extensive discussion to the relation of the individual to tradition, clarifying how tradition and interpretation (8)(1. complicate 2. interact 3. separate).
6:1 ガダマーは個人と伝統の関係について広範囲に議論をし、伝統と解釈がどのように担互に作用するか明らかにしている。
6:2 Any individual, in understanding his or her world, is continually involved in activities of interpretation.
6:2 いかなる個人も自分の世界を理解する際には、絶えず解釈行為に関わっている。
6:3 That interpretation is based on prejudice (or pre­understanding), which includes assumptions implicit in the language that the person uses.
6:3 そのような解釈は先入観(つまり、「前もっての判断」)に基づいており、先入観にはその個人が使う言語に潜在する前提が含まれている。
6:4 That language in turn is (9)(1. learned 2. forgotten 3 . intervened) through activities of interpretation.
6:4 そして今度は、その言語は解釈行為を通して、学ばれていくのである。
6:5 The individual is changed through the use of language, and the language changes through its use by individuals.
6:6 This process is of the first importance, since it constitutes the background of the beliefs and assumptions that determine the nature of our being.
6:6 この過程は最も重要である。というのは、それは、我々の存在の本質を決定する信念と前提の背景を構成するからである。
6:7 We are social creatures:
7:1 In fact history does not belong to us, but we belong to it.
7:2 Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and (10)(1. history 2. state 3. psychology) in which we live.
7:3 The focus of subjectivity is a distorting mirror.
7:4 The self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life.
7:5 That is why the prejudices of the individual, far (11)(1. more 2. less 3. later) than his judgments, constitute the historical reality of his being.
7:5 それ故に、個人の先入観はその判断以上に個人の存在の歴史的現実を構成するのである。
7:6 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975), p. 245.
7:6 ガダマー「真理と方法」(1975年) p.245
8:1 Gadamer sees in this essential historicity of our being the causeof our (12)(1. competence 2. tendency 3. inability) to achieve full explicit understanding of ourselves.
8:1 ガダマーは、我々の存在のもつこのような本質的な史実性の中に、我々が自分自身を十分に明白に理解できない原因があると見ている。
8:2 The nature of our being is determined by our cultural background, and (13)(1. after 2. since 3. before) it is formed in our very way of experiencing and living in language, it cannot be made fully explicit in that language:
9:1 To acquire an awareness of a situation is, however, always a task of particular difficulty.
9:1 しかしながら、ある状況の認識を得ることは、常に特に困難な仕事である。
9:2 The very idea of a situation means that we are (14)(1. really 2. not 3. naturally) standing outside it and hence are unable to have any objective knowledge of it.
9:3 We are always within the situation, and to throw light on it is a task that is never entirely completed.
9:4 This is true also of the hermeneutic situation, i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves with regard to the tradition that we are trying to understand.
9:4 これはまた、解釈学的状況、つまり、我々が理解しようと努めている伝統との関係で自分自身を考える状況にもあてはまる。
9:5 The illumination of this situation — effective-historical reflection — can never be completely (15) (1. achieved 2. ignored 3. persisted), but this is not due to a lack in the reflection, but lies in the essence of the historical being which is ours.
9:5 この状況を明らかにすること、つまり効果的に歴史的に考えることは、決して完全には成し遂げられないことであるが、これは思考の不足によるのではなくて、我々のものである歴史的存在の本質によるのである。
9:6To exist historically means that knowledge of oneself can (16)(1. indeed 2. always 3. never) be complete.
9:7 Gadamer, Truth and Method (1975), pp.268-269.
9:7 ガダマー「真理と方法」(1975年) p.268-269
10:1 We can become aware of some of our prejudices, and in that way emancipate ourselves from some of the limits they place on our thinking.
10:2 But we commit a fallacy in believing we can ever be (17) (1. full 2. free 3. composed) of all prejudice.
10:2 しかし、我々はすべての先入観から、解放されうると信じることにおいて、間違いを犯している。
10:3 Instead of striving for a means of getting away from our own preunderstanding, a theory of interpretation should aim at revealing the ways in which that preunderstanding interacts with the text.
11:1 Gadamer’s approach accepts the inevitability of the hermeneutic circle.
11:1 ガダマーの取り組み法は「解釈学的循環」の必然性を受け入れる。
11:2 The meaning of an individual text is contextual, depending on the moment of interpretation and the horizon brought to it by the (18)(1. text 2. interpreter 3. fallacy).
11:3 But that horizon is itself the product of a history of interactions in language, interactions which themselves represent texts that had to be understood in the light of preunderstanding.
11:3 しかし、そのような視野はそれ自体、言語における相互作用の歴史の産物であり、その相互作用は、それ自体、先入観に照らして理解されなければならない原典を表すのである。
11:4 What we understand is based on what we already know, and what we already know comes from being able to (19)(1. decontextualize 2. understand 3. forget).
12:1 Gadamer’s discourse on language and tradition is based on a rather broad analysis of interpretation and understanding.
12:1 ガダマーの言語と伝統に関する論文は、解釈と理解のかなり広範な分析に基づくものである。
12:2 If we observe the hermeneutic circle only at the coarse-grained level offered by texts and societies, we remain (20)(1. geared 2. consistent 3. blind) to its operation at the much finer-grained level of daily life.
12:2 もし我々が、原典と社会によって示されるきめの荒いレベルからのみ、解釈学的循環を観察するならば、日常生活のはるかにきめの細かいレベルにおけるその循環の作用が、見えないままとなる。
12:3 If we look only at language, we fail to relate it to the interpretation that constitutes non­linguistic experience as well.
12:3 もし我々が言語のみを見るならば、言語を、非言語的経験をも構成する解釈と関連づけることができないのである。

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